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Supplemental Forms of Intellectual Property 
Protection for Plants* 
Mark D. Janis** 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
A new hierarchy of intellectual property protection for 
plant innovation is emerging.  Utility patent protection is 
poised to become the dominant intellectual property 
mechanism for plants in the U.S. and perhaps elsewhere.  
Plant breeder’s rights systems continue to garner a dedicated 
following, especially in developing countries, as a means for 
complying with international intellectual property treaty 
obligations.  But while utility patent and plant breeder’s rights 
regimes have come to occupy the first tier of the intellectual 
property hierarchy for plants, other forms of intellectual 
property protection remain important, albeit in a supplemental 
role.  This article surveys supplemental intellectual property 
strategies for plants in three areas: trade secrets (Section II); 
trademarks and unfair competition (Section III); and post-sale 
license restrictions (Section IV). 
II.  TRADE SECRETS 
Trade secret protection has long been used in the seed 
industry.  In this section, after briefly reviewing the general 
legal standards and sources of law for trade secret protection, I 
will analyze the leading decision on the use of trade secret 
protection to protect germplasm – the Pioneer v. Holden’s case, 
and then consider some key determinants influencing the 
choice between patent protection and trade secret protection for 
plant-related innovation. 
                                                          
 * This paper was prepared in connection with the ISF (International 
Seed Federation) International Seminar on the Protection of Intellectual 
Property and Access to Plant Genetic Resources, Berlin, Germany, May 2004. 
 ** Professor of Law and H. Blair & Joan V. White Intellectual Property 
Law Scholar, University of Iowa College of Law. 
JANIS_S7 12/29/2004  2:36:41 PM 
308 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. [Vol.6:1 
 
A.  INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC STANDARDS 
Trade secret protection is possibly the least formalized of 
all types of intellectual property protection.  It entails no 
registration process, nor any official government document 
memorializing the existence or subject matter of the protection. 
Trade secret protection operates on the theory that (1) a 
firm’s secret information may have commercial value, and (2) 
the law should intervene against competitors who seek to 
appropriate that value through improper practices.1  This 
theory may be understood both as a matter of preserving fair 
competition so that competitors do not become unjustly 
enriched and as a matter of securing a firm’s intangible 
property so that a firm will have an incentive to generate 
additional valuable information. 
The obligation to protect trade secrets is now established 
as a matter of international law, through Article 39 of the 
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights (TRIPS).2  Article 39 requires the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) members to protect undisclosed 
information pursuant to the more general obligation to protect 
against unfair competition.3 
In general, TRIPS Article 39 leaves WTO members 
considerable discretion to shape national law on the details of 
trade secret protection.  TRIPS Article 39 defines the concept of 
trade secret broadly but conventionally, sweeping in all manner 
of confidential information that has value as a consequence of 
its secrecy, where the owner of the information has taken 
reasonable steps to maintain secrecy.4  Article 39 also defines 
misappropriation broadly, as encompassing acts that are 
“contrary to honest commercial practices.”5 
Article 39 also includes one special provision that may be 
                                                          
 1. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 cmt. a 
(1995). 
 2. See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World 
Trade Organization, Annex 1C, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS – RESULTS OF THE 
URUGUAY ROUND, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS], available at 
http://www.wto.org /english/tratop_e/trips_e/t_agm0_e.htm (last visited 
Oct. 14, 2004). 
 3. See id. art. 39.1. 
 4. See id. art. 39.2. 
 5. Id.; TRIPS footnote 10 lists illustrative acts that may be deemed 
contrary to honest commercial practices, including such behavior as breach of 
contract, and breach of a confidential relationship.  Id. art. 39.2 n.10. 
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of future interest to plant biotechnology firms.  Article 39.3 
requires that WTO members protect trade secrets from 
disclosure and commercial use when the secret is required to be 
submitted to a government agency for market approval.6  
Currently, the requirement applies only to trade secrets 
concerning pharmaceuticals and agricultural chemical 
products.7  If nations enact elaborate regulatory approval 
schemes for transgenic plants, firms may wish to press for 
expansion of Article 39.3’s protections. 
In the United States, the TRIPS Article 39 obligations are 
implemented through state law.  While the precise character of 
trade secret protection may vary from state to state, many 
states have adopted the Uniform Trade Secrets Act (UTSA).8  
The following general comments reflect the approach followed 
in UTSA jurisdictions.9 
First, consistent with the international standard, the 
UTSA defines trade secret broadly, to embrace such subject 
matter as formulas, compilations of information, techniques, 
and processes, where the subject matter derives independent 
economic value from it secrecy, and where the subject matter is 
the subject of reasonable efforts to maintain secrecy.10  The 
subject matter need not be novel in the patent law sense.11 
Second, the UTSA defines misappropriation in terms 
analogous to those used in TRIPS Article 39.  Misappropriation 
may occur in a variety of ways – e.g., through breach of a 
confidential relationship, or when a trade secret is otherwise 
acquired via “improper means.”12  Critically, independent 
discovery, through analysis of publicly-available information or 
through reverse engineering, does not constitute “improper 
means,” a feature that distinguishes trade secret protection 
                                                          
 6. See id. art. 39.3. 
 7. Id. art. 39.3. 
 8. UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS ACT (1985) [hereinafter UTSA], available at 
http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/fnact99/1980s/utsa85.htm (last visited Nov. 
17, 2004);  see also ROGER M. MILGRIM, MILGRIM ON TRADE SECRETS 
§1.01[2][a] (2004). 
 9. I have largely limited these comments to trade secret law in the 
United States.  For a survey of trade secret law in a European jurisdiction, 
see, for example, Jon Lang, The Protection of Commercial Trade Secrets, 25 
EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 462 (2003). 
 10. See UTSA § 1(4) (1985). 
 11. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 cmt. e (1995). 
 12. See UTSA § 1(2). 
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from utility patent protection.13 
Third, trade secret protection is not subject to a fixed term 
of protection.  Trade secret protection endures as long as the 
subject matter remains secret.14  However, suits for trade 
secret misappropriation are likely to be subject to a two- or 
three-year statute of limitations (commencing from the time 
when the misappropriation was discovered, or would have been 
discovered through the exercise of reasonable diligence).15 
B.  LESSONS FROM PIONEER V. HOLDEN 
The leading case on the application of trade secret law to 
plant germplasm is Pioneer v. Holden.16  The case involved an 
assertion of trade secret protection that is considered to be 
typical in the seed industry: trade secrets in the identity and 
genetics of the inbred parents of a commercially-distributed 
hybrid.  In particular, Pioneer asserted that it owned a trade 
secret in inbred lines (including a line designated H3H) used as 
male parents for certain valuable corn hybrids.17  The court 
upheld Pioneer’s claim for liability under both trade secret and 
unfair competition theories. 
Others have written in detail about the complex facts and 
principal arguments in the case.18  This article will forego a 
lengthy discussion and concentrate instead on examining three 
                                                          
 13. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 43 (1995). 
 14.  In Advanta USA, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc., the court 
considered whether the issuance of a plant variety protection certificate on a 
given variety resulted in disclosure barring any subsequent assertion of trade 
secret protection with respect to that variety.  No. 04-C-238-S, slip op. (W.D. 
Wisc. Oct. 27, 2004) (summarized in Plant Variety Protection Act Does Not 
Preempt State Law Trade Secret Action, PAT. TM. & COPYRT. J., Nov. 19, 2004, 
at 43).  Advanta framed the argument as a preemption argument: whether the 
U.S. Plant Variety Protection Act preempted state law trade secret claims.  
The court rejected the argument.  Id.  Indeed, a plant variety certificate need 
not be accessible to the public.  See Mark D. Janis & Jay P. Kesan, U.S. Plant 
Variety Protection: Sound and Fury . . .?, 39 HOUS. L. REV. 727, 747-48 (2002).  
Thus, the court was correct to reject the view that as a matter of law, the 
issuance of a plant variety protection certificate would necessarily exterminate 
trade secret protection. 
 15. For a trade secret case in the seed industry in which the statute of 
limitations came into issue, see E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Monsanto 
Co., No. CIV.A. 00-359-SLR, 2001 WL 652019, at *1 (D. Del. 2001). 
 16. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc. v. Holden Found. Seeds, Inc., 35 F.3d 1226 
(8th Cir. 1994). 
 17. Id. at 1229. 
 18. See, e.g., Debra L. Blair, Intellectual Property Protection and its 
Impact on the U.S. Seed Industry, 4 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 297, 308-10 (1999). 
JANIS_S7 12/29/2004  2:36:41 PM 
2004] PROTECTION FOR PLANTS 311 
 
lessons from the case that remain relevant in the current 
intellectual property environment. 
First, Pioneer v. Holden provides a helpful illustration of 
the concept of “reasonable measures” to maintain secrecy, as 
applied to the enterprise of plant breeding.  For example, 
Pioneer had imposed express confidentiality restrictions in 
agreements with its contract growers, had forbidden the use of 
signage in fields, and had used coded labels on its seed bags.19  
The court concluded that this combination of safeguards 
satisfied Pioneer’s obligation to undertake reasonable measures 
to maintain secrecy.20 
Second, Pioneer v. Holden rejects the proposition that the 
possible existence of selfs in a seed bag destroys trade secret 
protection.21  The court was satisfied that Pioneer’s practices 
had greatly limited the prospect that male inbreds would 
accidentally appear in bags of hybrid seed.22 Importantly, 
however, the court did not resolve the question whether the act 
of “chasing the selfs” constitutes proper reverse engineering or 
“improper means.”23 
Third, Pioneer v. Holden delivers a mixed message on the 
issue of the difficulty of proving misappropriation in a trade 
secret case involving biological subject matter.  On the one 
hand, on the basis of very close similarity between the Pioneer 
and Holden seeds, the court was willing to infer probable 
misappropriation, and shift to Holden’s the burden of coming 
forward with evidence of independent development.24  On the 
other hand, the court cited the peculiar facts of the case as 
support for drawing the inference of misappropriation.25  The 
court pointed to allegations of a pattern of behavior by Holden’s 
involving alleged efforts to discover Pioneer’s trade secrets over 
a period of years, alleged discarding of information relevant to 
the parentage of its own product, and other facts that suggest 
that future litigants might find it easy to distinguish Pioneer v. 
                                                          
 19. Pioneer, 35 F.3d at 1236. 
 20. Id. at 1236-37. 
 21. See id. at 1236. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. at 1238-41. 
 24. See id. at 1240-41. The burden shift issue continues to be litigated in 
trade secret cases in the United States. See Moore v. Kulicke & Soffa Indus., 
Inc., 318 F.3d 561, 573-74 (3d Cir. 2003) (holding that when plaintiff presents 
evidence of product similarity, the burden of persuasion shifts to the 
defendant to come forward with evidence of independent development). 
 25. See Pioneer, 35 F.3d at 1239-40. 
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Holden.26  Moreover, even after according weight to these facts, 
the court still found the misappropriation issue to be a close 
one, and obviously struggled with the complexity of the 
technical evidence.27 
C.  PATENTS V. TRADE SECRETS: SOME KEY DETERMINANTS 
In view of the general tenor of trade secret protection, and 
the specific illustration of trade secret protection applied to the 
seed industry in Pioneer v. Holden, what are the factors that 
might inform a firm’s choice about whether to pursue trade 
secret protection (which forbids disclosure), as opposed to 
utility patent protection (which requires disclosure and thus 
eliminates future claims of trade secret protection for the 
disclosed subject matter)?  Most observers would expect firms 
to favor utility patent protection over trade secret protection in 
any usual case.  Indeed, when considering whether the federal 
patent regime preempted state trade secret law, the U.S. 
Supreme Court concluded that trade secret protection was 
generally so weak as compared to patent protection that, as a 
practical matter, there was little risk that firms would choose 
trade secret protection for any given invention if patent 
protection was likely available.28  The relevant question, then, 
is whether there are trends in either patent law or trade secret 
law that might operate at the margins – for example, making 
trade secret protection even marginally more attractive as 
compared to utility patent protection.29 
Certainly, a number of recent trends in patent law run in 
precisely the opposite direction, bolstering utility patents as a 
preferred means of protection for plants over trade secrets.  In 
J.E.M. Ag. Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc,30 the U.S. 
                                                          
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. at 1239.  For more on the complexity of discovery in a germplasm 
misappropriation case, see, for example, Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc. v. Asgrow 
Seed Co., Nos. Civ. 4-98-CV-90577, Civ. 4-98-CV-90578, 2000 WL 33363188, at 
*3 (S.D. Iowa 2000) (referring to the prospect that discovery could involve 
multiple grow-outs extending over several Midwestern growing seasons and 
lamenting the sheer complexity of the case). 
 28. See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 489-91 (1974). 
 29. For a general discussion of the topic, see, for example, Andrew 
Beckerman-Rodau, The Choice Between Patent Protection and Trade Secret 
Protection: A Legal and Business Decision, 84 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK. OFF. 
SOC’Y 371 (2002). 
 30. J.E.M. Ag. Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124 
(2001). 
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Supreme Court upheld the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office’s 
longstanding view that seed-grown plants constituted patent-
eligible subject matter within the meaning of the U.S. utility 
patent statute.31  In Monsanto Canada Inc. v. Schmeiser,32 the 
Canada Supreme Court rejected a grower’s argument that 
patent infringement could be excused if it was “innocent.”33  
Although there is no comparable authoritative decision in the 
U.S., U.S. patent infringement law is founded on the premise 
that innocent or independent development is not a defense, 
whereas independent development is a defense to trade secret 
protection.34  In Monsanto Co. v. McFarling 35 (“McFarling II”), 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit confirmed 
that utility patent infringement is not subject to a seed-saving 
exemption, notwithstanding the existence of such an exemption 
under plant breeder’s rights schemes such as the U.S. Plant 
Variety Protection Act (PVPA).36 
A few trends do cut in favor of trade secret protection.  
Taken collectively, these trends could result in a reduction in 
the value of utility patents, and could make the patent versus 
trade secret decision a closer call in some situations.  First, 
U.S. patent law continues to impose relatively rigorous 
standards for patent disclosures in the chemical and 
biotechnological arts.37  One of the disclosure requirements, 
                                                          
 31. Id. at 145-46. 
 32. Monsanto Canada Inc. v. Schmeiser, [2004] S.C.R. 902 (Can.) 
 33. Id. 
 34. To put the same point differently, utility patent infringement requires 
no showing of copying or derivation.  For utility patents on plants, this rule is 
most advantageous to patent owners who claim by genotype or phenotype.  
Where patent claims are directed to specific varieties, as a practical matter, 
the patent claim is likely to be infringed only by someone who physically 
appropriates patented seed or plant matter.  See Nicholas Seay, Intellectual 
Property Rights in Plants, in CSSA SPECIAL PUB. NO. 21, INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY RIGHTS: PROTECTION OF PLANT MATERIALS 61, 69 (1993). 
 35. See Monsanto Co. v. McFarling, 363 F.3d 1336, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2004) 
[hereinafter McFarling II].  By the same reasoning, utility patent 
infringement in the U.S. would not be subject to a breeder’s exemption, 
although this does not preclude the possibility that some types of breeding 
activity would be deemed to fall within the general, common law experimental 
use defense.  See  Mark D. Janis, Rules v. Standards for Patent Law in the 
Plant Sciences (forthcoming 2005). 
 36.  See Plant Variety Protection Act of 1970, 35 U.S.C. §§ 2321-2582 
(1994).   
 37. See, e.g., Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle, Inc., 358 F.3d 916, 929 
(Fed. Cir. 2004) (applying the written description requirement to invalidate a 
patent claim in a pharmaceutical case). 
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enablement,38 has proven to be a significant obstacle to broad 
claims to transgenic plants.39 
Second, the U.S. PTO’s application of the nonobviousness 
requirement is under continual scrutiny in patent policy circles, 
especially in current debates, where arguments for more 
rigorous application of the requirement are commonplace.40  
The practice of granting of U.S. patents to conventionally-bred 
plant varieties, in which the claimed variety is a novel but 
predictable outcome of a well-known breeding technique, may 
be a candidate for reform if calls for a more robust non-
obviousness standard are heeded. 
Third, some patent law doctrines that have been the 
subject of recent legislative changes may be due for yet further 
reforms.  Relatively new U.S. patent rules require that any 
pending patent application be published 18 months after its 
effective filing date, but patent applicants may opt out of 
publication under a variety of circumstances.41  Future 
legislation might restrict or eliminate opt-out opportunities, 
potentially prompting some patent applicants to abandon their 
applications prior to publication in favor of trade secrecy.42  
Another relatively new U.S. patent rule allows a defense to 
infringement for prior users, typically prior users of trade 
secrets.43 Current rules extend the defense only to business 
method patents, but future legislation might expand prior user 
rights to encompass all technologies. 
                                                          
 38. Enablement refers to the requirement that the patentee provide a 
disclosure that enables one of ordinary skill in the art to make and use the 
claimed invention.  35 U.S.C. § 112 para. 1 (2000). 
 39. See, e.g., Monsanto Co. v. Bayer Bioscience N.V., Ltd., 363 F.3d 1235 
(Fed. Cir. 2004) (disclosing transformation of dicots with truncated Bt gene in 
late 1980s may not have enabled transformation of all plant cells, including 
monocots); Plant Genetic Sys. N.V. v. DeKalb Genetics Corp., 315 F.3d 1335 
(Fed. Cir. 2003) (disclosing transformation of dicots with bar gene in 1980s did 
not enable transformation of all plant cells, including monocots); Adang v. 
Fischhoff, 286 F.3d 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (disclosing transformation of tobacco 
plants with Bt gene in 1980s does not enable interference count directed to 
transformation of tomato plants with Bt gene). 
 40. See, e.g., COMM. ON INTELLECTUAL PROP. RIGHTS IN THE KNOWLEDGE-
BASED ECON., NAT’L. RESEARCH COUNCIL: A PATENT SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST 
CENTURY 72-78 (Stephen A. Merrill et al. eds., 2004); FEDERAL TRADE 
COMM’N, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF COMPETITION 
AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY ch. 4 (2003). 
 41. 35 U.S.C. § 122. 
 42. See, e.g., COMM. ON INTELLECTUAL PROP. RIGHTS, supra note 40, at 
52-53 (discussing the shortcomings of the current regime). 
 43. See 35 U.S.C. § 273 (2000) (effective 1999). 
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These trends make trade secrecy potentially more 
attractive, and thus bear watching.  They must be coupled with 
considerations of product life cycles, the cost of obtaining 
patent protection, and the technical feasibility of reverse 
engineering.  Overall, it seems likely that trade secrecy will 
remain no more than a supplemental option for plant breeders, 
and for inventors in many other technology areas as well. 
III.  TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION 
In a time when product differentiation is becoming more 
important in the seed industry, it seems likely that trademark 
and unfair competition laws will become more relevant than 
ever before as a supplemental means for protecting goodwill 
associated with particular seed products.  Interestingly, 
trademark protection was one of the earliest forms of plant-
specific intellectual property regimes proposed in the United 
States.  Legislation proposed in 1906 would have created 
special trademark-like protection for plant names.44  The 
proposal failed to become law, perhaps because it purported to 
use trademark law as a way to incentivize innovation in plant 
breeding, a task better suited for the patent laws.  Trademark 
and unfair competition laws could provide important incentives 
for plant breeding today, but only as a supplement to patent 
law, not as a surrogate for it.  In this section, I first discuss 
general principles of trademark and unfair competition law, 
then consider issues relating to the acquisition of registered 
trademark rights for seed and plant biotechnology products, 
and next look at the enforcement of unfair competition laws 
against germplasm misappropriation and other false 
representations, focusing on U.S. law. 
A.  GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF TRADEMARK AND UNFAIR 
COMPETITION LAW 
The basic premises underlying trademark law are well-
established.45  Trademark law seeks to protect the goodwill, 
and assurance of consistent quality, that a producer builds up 
in a mark through investing in promotion of that mark in 
                                                          
 44. See H.R. 13570, 59th Cong. (1906) (authorizing the Registration of the 
Names of Horticultural Products and to Protect the Same).  For a discussion, 
see Mark D. Janis & Jay P. Kesan, U.S. Plant Variety Protection: Sound and 
Fury. . .?, 39 HOUS. L. REV. 727, 731-33 (2002). 
 45. In the U.S., the Lanham Act governs trademark and unfair 
competition causes of action.  See Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127. 
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connection with particular products or services.  By granting 
producers exclusive rights in the use of marks in connection 
with particular products or services, the law provides producers 
with security for further investments in maintaining goodwill 
and quality, and it ensures that potential new market entrants 
will not be able to free-ride on that goodwill by adopting the 
same or a confusingly similar mark.46  Trademark law also 
seeks to protect consumers by reducing their search costs and 
reducing the possibility that consumers will be misled by firms 
that attempt to pass off their goods as those of their 
competitors. 
Trademark and unfair competition laws seek to effectuate 
producer and consumer protections in two somewhat different 
ways.  Under traditional trademark law, the producer gets 
weak property rights to exclude newcomers from using 
confusingly similar marks on similar products and services.47  
That is, the focus is on granting property rights, albeit limited 
ones, to the producer.  Under unfair competition law, the focus 
is on the nature of the newcomer’s actions.  If the newcomer 
makes false representations in the marketplace that cause 
harm to the established producer, the producer may bring an 
unfair competition cause of action, even if the newcomer’s false 
representations do not interfere with any registered trademark 
rights of the producer.48 
B.  REGISTERED TRADEMARK RIGHTS FOR PLANTS AND PLANT 
BIOTECHNOLOGY 
The U.S. trademark law generously defines “trademark” to 
encompass both verbal and non-verbal source designations.49  
One of the principal prerequisites for obtaining trademark 
protection is that the mark be distinctive.50  Distinctiveness is a 
                                                          
 46. For an overview of these basic themes, see GRAEME B. DINWOODIE & 
MARK D. JANIS, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION: LAW AND POLICY 3-
46 (2004). 
 47. By “traditional” trademark law, I mean to refer to the core trademark 
infringement liability theory, “a likelihood of consumer confusion.”  Other 
theories, such as trademark dilution, arguably give trademark owners much 
stronger property rights that are not necessarily limited to the use of the mark 
in connection with particular goods and services. 
 48. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2000). 
 49. Id. § 1127. 
 50. Id. § 1125(c)(1).  Marks must also be non-functional, and must meet 
requirements for adoption and use under the U.S. system.  Qualitex Co. v. 
Jacobson Products Co., Inc., 514 U.S. 159, 164-65 (1995) (discussing the 
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term of art in trademark law meaning, in rough terms, that the 
mark does not merely restate the genus to which the products 
or services belong.51  Marks can be deemed distinctive because 
of their inherent attributes, or because they acquire 
distinctiveness through use in the marketplace.52 
Seed firms have employed trademark protection in many 
fairly predictable, and some less predictable, ways.  Monsanto 
has registered the word mark ROUNDUP READY for seeds 
and herbicide-tolerant genes.53  Pioneer has also registered its 
famous logo.  Seed companies undoubtedly consider features 
such as the combination of color and graphics on seed bags to 
constitute distinctive product packaging trade dress.  Firms 
might employ other strategies as well, such as impregnating a 
seed product with a particular distinctive color and claiming 
trademark protection in that color as used in connection with 
seed products.  Under U.S. law, such a claim is viable if the 
firm can show that the color has acquired distinctiveness 
through use in the marketplace.54 
A more difficult issue is whether seed companies should be 
entitled to assert trademark rights in the names of plant 
varieties.  The answer as a matter of black-letter law is 
straightforward: plant variety designations are deemed generic, 
and hence are unprotectable as trademarks.  However, the 
justifications for this rule are not entirely consonant with 
standard trademark law, and deserve close scrutiny. 
Plant variety designations are subject to regulations that 
do not apply to other product designations. In the U.S., the 
Federal Seed Act55 imposes various “truth-in-labeling” 
requirements on seed firms who desire to market seeds in U.S. 
commerce.  In international law, Article 20 of International 
Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants 
(UPOV)56 specifies that plant varieties that are the subject of 
                                                          
functionality doctrine). 
 51. Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9 (2d Cir. 
1976). 
 52. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205, 210-12 
(2000). 
 53. See, e.g., U.S. Tm. Reg. 1,889,104 (ROUNDUP READY for “herbicide-
tolerant genes for use in the production of agricultural seed”). 
 54. See Qualitex Co. v. Jacobsen Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159 (1995) (holding a 
color of a product protectable as a trademark if a secondary meaning can be 
shown). 
 55. See 7 U.S.C. §§ 1551-1611 (1939). 
 56. See International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of 
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plant breeder’s rights must be marketed under an established 
“variety denomination.”57  Article 20(1)(a) requires that the 
designated variety denomination be deemed the generic 
designation for the plant variety.58  Other provisions require 
that “no rights in the designation registered as the 
denomination of the variety shall hamper the free use of the 
denomination in connection with the variety, even after 
expiration of the breeder’s rights,”59 and that any party who 
markets propagating material for a protected variety must use 
the denomination, even after the expiration of the breeder’s 
right in that variety.60 
These requirements are inconsistent with any assertion of 
trademark protection in plant variety denominations.  
Genericness is the antithesis of trademark distinctiveness.  
Thus, it is not surprising that the United States Patent and 
Trademark Office (PTO) has taken the position that it will 
refuse registration of any word mark for plants or seeds that 
“comprises a varietal or cultivar name,”61 on grounds of 
genericness.62 
The PTO’s stance does not appear to have caused grave 
practical problems for seed companies.  A seed company can 
                                                          
Plants, Dec. 2, 1961, 33 U.S.T. 2703, 815 U.N.T.S. 89, as amended on Mar. 19, 
1991 [hereinafter UPOV], available at http://www.upov.int/en/publications/ 
conventions/1991/pdf/ act1991.pdf.   
 57. Id. art. 20. 
 58. See id. art. 20(1)(a). 
 59. Id. art. 20(1)(b). 
 60. See id. art. 20(7). 
 61. See UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, TRADEMARK 
MANUAL OF EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 1202.12 (2003) [hereinafter TMEP], 
available at 
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/tac/tmep/1200.htm#_Toc2665947; In re Delta 
& Pine Land Co., 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1157, 1159 n.4 (TTAB 1993) (stating 
there is “no question” that varietal designations are generic and 
unregistrable); In re Hilltop Orchards & Nurseries, Inc., 206 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 
1034 (TTAB 1979) (affirming the rejection of COMMANDER YORK for apple 
tree on the ground that it would be perceived as “common descriptive name” of 
the goods); In re Cohn Bodger & Sons Co., 122 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 345, 346 (TTAB 
1959) (concluding that “‘BODGER’ is the trademark, and ‘BLUE LUSTRE’ is 
the varietal name designating a hybrid petunia of a specific variety and color 
rather than a brand-name identifying seeds sold only by applicant and 
distinguishing them from seeds sold by others”). 
 62. These decisions precede U.S. accession to UPOV.  Indeed, the early 
case precedes the creation of UPOV.  UPOV compliance cannot have been the 
impetus for the U.S. rule.  In any event, U.S. cases do not appear to limit the 
genericness rule to plant varieties that are the subject of Plant Variety 
Protection certificates. 
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choose a rather mundane designation (often a combination of 
letters and numbers) as the variety denomination, and then 
choose a more memorable “fancy” name to accompany the 
variety denomination on any product packaging and 
advertising.  While the company must concede away any 
trademark rights in the variety denomination, the company 
should still be entitled assert rights in the accompanying fancy 
name.  The UPOV scheme expressly provides that “[w]hen a 
variety is offered for sale or marketed, it shall be permitted to 
associate a trademark, trade name or other similar indication 
with a registered variety denomination.”63  Unfortunately, this 
arrangement would seem to invite arguments over what really 
constitutes the unprotectable variety denomination as opposed 
to the protectable accompanying mark.   
The problems with the PTO’s position relate, instead, to 
the rationales for denying trademark protection.  The cases 
appear to espouse two rationales: genericness (as already 
discussed) and alleged duplicate protection due to a perceived 
conflict with patent and plant variety protection (PVP) law.  As 
discussed further, the rationales are blended in some cases.  In 
Hilltop, for example, the trademark examiner cited the 
applicant’s plant patent as “evidence that the goods on which 
the mark is used is indeed a variety,” supporting the 
genericness theory.64  Similarly, the U.S. Trademark Manual of 
Examining Procedure instructs trademark examiners that: 
Whenever an application is filed to register a mark containing 
wording for live plants or agricultural seeds, the examining attorney 
must inquire of the applicant whether the term has ever been used as 
a varietal name, and whether such name has been used in connection 
with a plant patent, a utility patent, or a certificate for plant variety 
protection.65 
Viewed purely as a matter of trademark policy, neither 
rationale is very compelling. 
First, setting aside the UPOV and related truth-in-labeling 
requirements for seeds, it is not clear that plant breeders 
always use variety denominations as generic references.66  
                                                          
 63. UPOV, supra note 56, art. 20(8). 
 64. Hilltop, 206 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 1035. 
 65. TMEP, supra note 61, § 1202.12. 
 66. In other areas, model designations have sometimes been deemed 
registrable as trademarks without apparent negative consequences for 
competition.  See, e.g., In re Petersen Mfg. Co., 229 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 466, 468 
(TTAB 1986) (referring to letter-number combinations for locking hand tools 
and stating, “there is no question that such model designations can, through 
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Standard trademark law calls for a case-by-case assessment of 
genericness.  While standard trademark law certainly can be 
altered by external rules such as truth-in-labeling 
requirements originating from UPOV, such alterations should 
be treated as exceptional, and the external rules should be 
narrowly construed. 
Second, the argument that trademark protection would 
conflict with the goals of the patent or PVP regimes is flawed.  
In Dixie Rose,67 the court reviewed the Trademark Office’s 
refusal to register TEXAS CENTENNIAL (and design) for 
roses, scions, and cuttings under the 1905 Act, predecessor to 
the current U.S. trademark statute.  In upholding the refusal, 
the court adopted the genericness rationale, but also asserted 
that offering trademark protection would give the applicant an 
“unfair advantage” because the applicant also had plant patent 
protection for the roses.68  According to the court, the applicant 
trademark protection would “tend to prolong [the applicant’s] 
monopoly, beyond the life of [the applicant’s] patent, by making 
it difficult for a newcomer to break into the field.”69  Similarly, 
in the CHIEF BEMIDJI case,70 the Trademark Trial and 
Appeal Board (TTAB)71 asserted that 
[A]ny rights which applicant enjoys in the ‘CHIEF BEMIDJI’ plant 
derives from its [plant] patent since others are prohibited from 
growing and selling this variety during the life of said patent.  To 
grant applicant a [trademark] registration of this designation with all 
the statutory presumptions accruing therefrom would be inconsistent 
with the right which others will have upon the expiration of the 
patent not only to grow and sell the plant but also to use ‘CHIEF 
BEMIDJI’ as the varietal name.72 
In support, the TTAB cited the famous “Shredded Wheat” case, 
Kellogg Co. v. Nabisco Co.73 
                                                          
use and promotion, be perceived as marks indicating origin in addition to 
functioning as model designations”). 
 67. See Dixie Rose Nursery v. Coe, Comm’r of Patents, 131 F.2d 446 (D.C. 
Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 318 U.S. 782 (1943). 
 68. See id. at 447. 
 69. Id. 
 70. In re Farmer Seed & Nursery Co., 137 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 231 (TTAB 
1963). 
 71. The TTAB is an administrative body within the U.S. PTO that 
receives appeals from applicants who have been refused registration by a 
trademark examiner. 
 72. Farmer, 137 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 232. 
 73. See id. at 232 (citing Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111 
(1938)). 
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But the Kellogg case cannot be fairly read to confer “an 
unlimited right to market” a formerly-patented product under a 
particular trademark.74  More fundamentally, it is simply not 
clear that a patent owner enjoys a particular “advantage” in 
establishing trademark rights for its products that others 
would lack.  A patent does not provide its owner any 
affirmative right to do anything.  It only grants the owner the 
right to exclude others from commercially exploiting the 
claimed invention.  If the patentee itself desires to exploit the 
invention, the patentee must invest capital, and if the patentee 
desires to associate a particular trademark with the patented 
product, the patentee must also invest in building up goodwill, 
just as any other mark owner would need to do. 
It might be argued that a patent owner seeking to establish 
trademark rights still has an advantage over others: he or she 
need not invest in building up goodwill at the same level as 
others because competitors are precluded by the patent from 
producing the patented product under a different mark.  But 
this argument begs for empirical evaluation.  Some trademark 
owners do not have close competitors even in the absence of 
patents, yet we certainly do not use the absence of competitors 
as an excuse to take away their trademark rights.  
Additionally, some trademark owners who do have patents may 
have to invest more in securing their trademark rights – the 
existence of the patent might actually be disadvantageous – 
because of the risk that consumers will come to consider the 
firm’s trademark as the generic reference to the goods, since 
the firm is the only marketer of the goods. 
In any event, loose rhetoric about overlaps between 
intellectual property regimes is particularly dangerous in the 
seed industry, where a multiplicity of intellectual property 
regimes may be invoked for any given product.75  Even if the 
trademark rules do not present immediate practical concerns 
for the seed industry, the industry should challenge the use of 
flawed rationales concerning conflicts among intellectual 
property regimes, lest those rationales be applied by analogy to 
                                                          
 74. See, e.g., Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Kellogg Co. v. Nabisco Co., in 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW STORIES (forthcoming 2005) (noting that the 
Court granted defendant the right to copy only on the condition that the 
defendant identify its product so that consumers could distinguish it from the 
plaintiff’s). 
 75. I develop this point in more detail in Mark D. Janis, Interface 
Measures and Collision Norms for Intellectual Property (forthcoming). 
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other intellectual property interfaces, such as that between the 
utility patent and plant breeder’s rights regimes.76 
C.  UNFAIR COMPETITION PROTECTION AGAINST GERMPLASM 
MISAPPROPRIATION 
Unfair competition law is another supplemental 
mechanism for protecting intellectual assets associated with 
plant breeding technology.  Unfair competition claims might be 
relevant in cases of germplasm misappropriation, brown bag 
sales, and other false representations about seed products. 
Unfair competition law is a standard component of modern 
intellectual property systems.  It is an established principle of 
international intellectual property law,77 and is implemented 
domestically in a variety of ways.  The Lanham Act § 43(a)78 is 
the principal basis for federal unfair competition claims.  In its 
usual manifestations, § 43(a) is similar to a trademark 
infringement cause of action, except that a § 43(a) action does 
not require any registered trademark rights, and theoretically 
contemplates a broader array of unfair commercial practices 
than technical trademark infringement – practices that may 
include a variety of false representations about one’s own or 
another’s products or services.79 
                                                          
 76. For a slightly different, but still sympathetic, argument, see Stanley 
D. Schlosser, The Registration of Plant Variety Denominations, 29 IDEA 177 
(1988).  Schlosser argues that when the patent or plant breeder’s certificate 
expires, competitors should be free “to commercialize the formerly protected 
variety” but the competitor “is not automatically free, however, to utilize the 
patent owner’s trademark in his marketing”; this instead should be a matter 
for case-by-case adjudication on the merits of the trademark claim.  Id. at 184.  
Schlosser also asserts that the relationship between trademark rights and 
variety denominations should be left to national law, and that the relevant 
UPOV provision on variety denominations (now Article 20) should be 
eliminated.  Id. at 188-89.   For a contrary view, taking the position that 
trademark law should be amended to make explicit the prohibition against 
trademark protection for variety denominations, see Paul van der Kooij, Is 
Something Rotten in the Member States, 22 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 189 
(2000).  Van der Kooij would extend this prohibition to all variety 
denominations, irrespective of whether the variety has been the subject of a 
plant breeder’s certificate.  Id. 
 77. See Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 
20, 1883, as last revised at Stockholm, July 14, 1967, art. 10bis, 21 U.S.T. 
1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 305 [hereinafter Paris Convention]. 
 78. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a). 
 79. The language of the statute amply supports a broad conception of 
unfair competition: 
(1) Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or services, or 
any container for goods, uses in commerce any word, term, name, 
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Courts adjudicating unfair competition cases in the U.S. 
have sometimes employed the labels “passing off” and “reverse 
passing off” to designate two separate categories of unfair 
competition claims.80  Suppose that a local seed producer places 
its own, low-quality seeds in bags that use the same distinctive 
color scheme, graphics, and perhaps use even the same brand 
as a multinational seed company.  The local seed producer has 
probably violated § 43(a) by attempting to “pass off” its own 
product as that of the multinational.  This is a mundane type of 
violation in unfair competition law, wherein a producer simply 
misrepresents its own products as a competitor’s. 
By contrast, suppose that the local seed producer 
appropriates another seed company’s germplasm by 
unauthorized means and produces seed.  The local producer 
then sells the seed under its own label (without, of course, any 
acknowledgment of its actual origin).  This is the passing off 
scenario in reverse: the local producer is now trying to pass off 
another’s product as the product of the local producer.  That is, 
a producer is misrepresenting someone else’s products as his 
own. 
In theory, a § 43(a) reverse passing off cause of action 
should be valuable as a supplemental intellectual property 
mechanism for use against misleading commercial practices in 
the seed industry.  As applied to cases involving the 
misappropriation of germplasm, a § 43(a) reverse passing off 
claim could serve as an alternative claim to a trade secret 
misappropriation claim.  Indeed, a reverse passing off claim 
succeeded in the Pioneer v. Holden case.81  A reverse passing off 
claim might be more attractive than a trade secret claim in 
                                                          
symbol, or device, or any combination thereof, or any false 
designation of origin, false or misleading description of fact, or false or 
misleading representation of fact, which-- 
(A) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to 
the affiliation, connection, or association of such person with another 
person, or as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her 
goods, services, or commercial activities by another person, or 
(B) in commercial advertising or promotion, misrepresents the nature, 
characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin of his or her or another 
person's goods, services, or commercial activities, 
shall be liable in a civil action by any person who believes that he or 
she is or is likely to be damaged by such act. 
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1). 
 80. See, e.g., Creeden v. Infosoft, Inc., 326 F.Supp.2d 876 (N.D. Ill. 2004); 
Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l v. Holden Found. Seeds, Inc., 35 F.3d 1226 (8th Cir. 
1994). 
 81. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l., 35 F.3d at 1241-42. 
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that reverse passing off is a federal claim, requires no showing 
of secrecy, and may call for less complex proofs than those 
necessary to show trade secret misappropriation.82 
Similarly, a § 43(a) reverse passing off action could 
theoretically be brought against parties who save a firm’s seed 
and sell it via “brown-bag” sales.  United States plant variety 
protection law already proscribes brown-bag selling of saved 
PVP-protected seed.83  However, if the subject seed does not 
enjoy PVP protection, or the certificate is invalid or expired, the 
proscription does not apply.84  In such circumstances, a seed 
firm could conceivably rely on a § 43(a) reverse passing off 
action.85  Under § 43(a) law, behavior of this type has been 
designated “implied” reverse passing off – that is, the act of 
“removing or obliterating the name of the source and then 
selling the product in an unbranded state.”86 
While these features would seem to signify that § 43(a) 
reverse passing off actions are to be taken seriously as vehicles 
for IP protection, § 43(a) actions are also subject to important 
limitations.  The scope of injunctive relief in a § 43(a) case – 
and in most other Lanham Act cases – is likely to be more 
limited than the injunctive relief that might issue in a utility 
patent or PVP case.  The remedy in a § 43(a) case is designed to 
address the consequences of the false representation.  
Ordinarily the remedy is aimed simply at alleviating consumer 
confusion.87  This means that even if a firm prevails in a § 43(a) 
action, the injunction may not, as a practical matter, prevent 
the enjoined competitor from marketing the product at issue.  
The competitor might, for example, include disclaimers on the 
label and thereby proceed free of the injunction. 
In addition, some in the U.S. are questioning the viability 
                                                          
 82. For example, in a reverse passing off case, it might be sufficient to 
prove that the germplasm did not originate with the local producer, without 
proving exact parentage, whereas ideally more direct evidence of 
misappropriation would be offered in a trade secret case. 
 83. 7 U.S.C. § 2543 (2000). 
 84. Id. § 2541. 
 85. There is no time limit on §43(a) actions, although in cases of 
unreasonable delay in commencing the action, § 43(a) might be limited by the 
equitable doctrine of laches. 
 86. Lamothe v. Atlantic Recording Corp., 847 F.2d 1403, 1406 (9th Cir. 
1998). 
 87. See J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION 
LAW § 30.3 (2004) (collecting authorities on a variety of limitations to the 
scope of injunctions in trademark and unfair competition cases). 
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of § 43(a) reverse passing off claims in the wake of the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s Dastar decision.88  Dastar was distributing a 
videotape set on World War II that it had created by copying 
and editing the tapes of an old television series.89  The series in 
turn was based on a book.90  Neither Dastar’s packaging, nor 
its screen credits on the videotapes, made any reference to the 
television series or the book.91  Fox produced a competing set of 
videotapes based on the same television series and sued to 
enjoin Dastar.92  Fox had owned the television series copyright 
but failed to renew it, so its only copyright claim was a possible 
claim as licensee of the copyright in the underlying book.93  
Instead of relying solely on copyright law, Fox also asserted a § 
43(a) reverse passing off claim, on the grounds that Dastar’s 
packaging misrepresented the videotapes as originating with 
Dastar, when in fact the underlying creative content of the 
videotapes was attributable to the producers of the television 
series and book.94  The lower courts accepted Dastar’s theory, 
but the U.S. Supreme Court rejected it.95  According to the 
Supreme Court, if a party produces a product, the party can 
represent that the product originates with it without violating § 
43(a), even if someone else was responsible for the underlying 
creative content.96 
Dastar cannot properly be read to have eliminated the § 
43(a) reverse passing off cause of action altogether. The Court’s 
opinion acknowledges that “every Circuit to consider the issue 
found § 43(a) broad enough to encompass reverse passing off” 
and concludes that the “language [of § 43(a)] is amply inclusive 
. . . of reverse passing off – if indeed it does not implicitly adopt 
the unanimous court of appeals jurisprudence on that 
subject.”97 
Moreover, the Court’s opinion indicates that it intended to 
endorse claims of reverse passing off where the defendant has 
                                                          
 88. Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23 
(2003). 
 89. Id. at 26. 
 90. Id. at 25-26. 
 91. Id. at 27. 
 92. Id. at 26-27. 
 93. Id. at 27. 
 94. Dastar, 539 U.S. at 27. 
 95. Id. at 27-28, 38. 
 96. Id. at 37-38.  The Court relied in part on a narrow construction of the 
term “origin” in § 43(a). 
 97. Id. at 30. 
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done nothing more than literally repackage the plaintiff’s 
goods.98  The Court opined that Fox’s claim against Dastar 
“would undoubtedly be sustained” if Dastar had simply bought 
Fox’s videotapes and replaced the Fox packaging with Dastar 
packaging.99 Presumably this means that if a firm buys another 
company’s seeds and simply pours them into a different bag 
and resells them, Dastar would not preclude a § 43(a) reverse 
passing off claim.100 
Would Dastar preclude a § 43(a) reverse passing off claim 
against brown bag sales of saved seed?  The brown bag seller 
would undoubtedly argue that he is not misrepresenting the 
“origin” of the goods because he produced the physical seeds 
that are being sold, even though the combination of valuable 
traits embodied in the seeds is the result of someone else’s 
breeding program.  The same argument would presumably be 
raised against a reverse passing off claim for misappropriation 
of germplasm, one of the theories in the Pioneer v. Holden case.  
A court in either case would need to determine whether to limit 
Dastar to its factual setting – in particular, whether to limit 
Dastar to cases involving unfair competition claims that seek to 
circumvent the limitations of copyright law.  The perceived 
conflict between trademark law and copyright law animates the 
Dastar rule, but the Court’s opinion also contains remarks that 
could be used to extend the rule beyond the 
trademark/copyright interface.  In Pioneer v. Syngenta,101 the 
court invoked Dastar in analyzing a germplasm 
misappropriation allegation.  Pioneer alleged that Syngenta 
had misappropriated Pioneer seed corn germplasm and used it 
in a Syngenta breeding program.  Among other theories, 
                                                          
 98. Id. at 31. 
 99. Id.  Instead, Dastar had produced its tapes by copying from the 
master tapes of the television series.  One may question whether the 
distinction between this behavior, and merely buying and repackaging tapes, 
is significant, given that the result is the same from the consumer’s 
perspective.  For a more thorough assessment and critique of Dastar, see 
Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Mark D. Janis, Revitalizing Unfair Competition Law 
(forthcoming). 
 100. For a post-Dastar ruling that is consistent with this position, see 
Carroll v. Kahn, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1357, 1361 (N.D.N.Y. 2003) (citing 
Dastar for the proposition that if plaintiff claims that defendant merely 
repackaged the product at issue - a movie - as its own, plaintiff states a claim, 
whereas if plaintiff claims that defendant failed to give attribution to plaintiff, 
plaintiff’s claim is barred). 
 101.  Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc. v. Syngenta Seeds, Inc., 4:02-cv-90541 (S.D. 
Iowa filed Aug. 17, 2004). 
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Pioneer asserted § 43(a) passing reverse passing off.  When the 
Supreme Court decided Dastar, Syngenta moved to dismiss the 
reverse passing off claim, asserting that Dastar foreclosed 
relief.  With little discussion,102 the court agreed. 
Pioneer v. Syngenta also discusses another important post-
Dastar issue.  A separate provision in § 43(a) governs causes of 
action for false advertising.103  The Court in Dastar noted that 
a false advertising claim might serve as a viable alternative to 
reverse passing off.104  It should be relatively easy of plaintiffs 
to reformulate their reverse passing off claims as false 
advertising claims as a temporary strategy for evading the 
limitations of Dastar.105 
Currently, there is no indication that European unfair 
competition law would countenance a restrictive rule like the 
rule of Dastar.  In particular, there is no reason to expect that 
European unfair competition law will adopt the cramped notion 
that false representations about “origin” are only actionable if 
they are false representations about the origin of the actual 
physical product.  Accordingly, unfair competition as a remedy 
for germplasm misappropriation in Europe should remain a 
viable supplement to other IP mechanisms.106 
IV.  POST-SALE CONTRACT RESTRICTIONS 
A discussion of supplemental forms of intellectual property 
protection for plants would be incomplete without an 
examination of the role of intellectual property license 
restrictions on breeding, resale, and other activities.  In 
particular, two broad classes of post-sale contract restrictions 
are familiar in the seed industry.  First, license provisions 
might restrict a grower’s use of purchased seed, prohibiting 
seed saving and replanting, and prohibiting resale outside the 
authorized distribution channels.107  Second, license 
                                                          
 102.  Pioneer apparently conceded that Dastar precluded relief. 
 103.  15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(B) (2000). 
 104.  Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 38 
(2003). 
 105. In Pioneer v. Syngenta, Pioneer was faced with the more difficult task 
of persuading the court that the reverse passing off claim actually stated a 
claim for false advertising.  The court rejected this argument. 
 106. For an authoritative synthesis of European notions of unfair 
competition law, see INTERNATIONAL BUREAU, WORLD INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY ORGANIZATION, WIPO PUB NO. 725(E), PROTECTION AGAINST 
UNFAIR COMPETITION (1994). 
 107. Examples include Monsanto’s technology agreement for growers who 
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restrictions might prohibit or limit breeding activities, 
including using a protected variety in a breeding program, 
and/or subjecting a protected variety (e.g., a trade secret-
protected variety) to reverse engineering.108 
The law of post-sale intellectual property contract 
restrictions invokes rules that are external to intellectual 
property altogether, as well as rules that are internal to it, but 
reside at the peripheries of its jurisprudence.  The area is 
complex and volatile.  Whether post-sale contract restrictions 
in an intellectual property license are enforceable generally 
may be understood as a matter of whether the restriction at 
issue conflicts with any of four sets of rules: (1) intellectual 
property rules on “exhaustion by sale”; (2) antitrust 
(competition) law rules; (3) general rules of contract 
enforcement; and (4) preemption rules (in particular, any rules 
that govern the interfaces between intellectual property 
regimes).  In this section, I briefly sketch out some of the issues 
and rules arising under each of these categories, as those issues 
have arisen under U.S. law. 
                                                          
purchase ROUNDUP READY® seed and Pioneer’s bag tag restrictions 
appearing on its bags of hybrid seed corn.  The Monsanto technology 
agreement litigated in McFarling I required that purchased seed be used “for 
planting a commercial crop only in a single season,” and required that the 
grower not “save any crop produced from [Monsanto’s patented] seed for 
replanting, or supply saved seeds to anyone for replanting.”  Monsanto Co. v. 
McFarling, 302 F.3d 1291, 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2002) [hereinafter McFarling I]. 
One of the Pioneer bag tag licenses, litigated in the Ottawa case, included the 
following language: 
One or more of the parental lines used in producing this product are 
proprietary to Pioneer Hi-Bred International, Inc. ("Pioneer"). 
Parental lines are U.S. Protected Varieties and may be protected 
under the laws of other countries; export or transfer of possession is 
prohibited.  Pioneer intends to supply only hybrid seed.  Customer 
agrees that it is not acquiring the rights to use any parental line for 
any purpose other than production of forage or grain for feeding or 
processing.  If the tag indicated this product is produced under one or 
more U.S. patents, customer is licensed thereunder only to produce 
forage or grain for feeding or processing. All uses outside the U.S. are 
prohibited to the extent they result in infringement of U.S. patents. 
Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc. v. Ottawa Plant Food, Inc., 283 F. Supp. 2d 1018, 
1025 (N.D. Iowa 2003) (emphasis in original). 
 108. See, e.g., Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc. v. DeKalb genetics Corp., 51 
U.S.P.Q. 1987 (S.D. Iowa 1999) (enforcing “bag tag” prohibiting purchasers of 
PVP-protected corn seed from using the seed for breeding or research 
purposes). 
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A. EXHAUSTION BY SALE 
U.S. utility patent law, like the law of most intellectual 
property regimes, includes a principle that is variously called 
“exhaustion by sale,” the “implied license,” or, less often in 
patent law but more frequently in other areas of intellectual 
property, the “first sale” doctrine.  Under this principle, when a 
customer purchases a patented product in an authorized sale, 
the customer is deemed to have received an implied patent 
license along with the physical product to use and dispose of 
the product in ordinary ways.109  The patent owner’s patent 
rights are “exhausted” in the specific physical product that is 
the subject of the sale; the authorized “first sale” of the product 
from the patent owner to the customer triggers the 
exhaustion.110  The rule may be understood as a reflection of 
the probable intentions of the patent owner and customer: the 
patent owner sets a price, and the customer is willing to pay 
the price, on the understanding that the purchaser will use the 
patented product for its ordinary purposes.  Because such use 
would require a patent license, the patent owner’s price must 
be understood to incorporate a patent license fee. 
A threshold issue concerning exhaustion rules is whether 
the principle of exhaustion overrides express conditions that a 
patent owner may place on a sale of a patented good.  In other 
words, the principle of exhaustion could, in theory, be viewed as 
an absolute rule, or merely as a default rule that a patentee can 
override by using express contract terms. 
U.S. courts have treated patent exhaustion as a default 
rule that a patentee can override with express contract 
restrictions,111 a sensible result if the exhaustion principle is 
treated as a consequence of an implied license reflecting the 
probable intention of the parties.  When a patentee adds 
express conditions to a sale of a patented product, the 
purchaser presumably pays a lower price as a result. 
This issue has arisen in litigation over the application of 
patent exhaustion principles to seed bag tags.  In Pioneer v. 
                                                          
 109. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 109 (2000) (detailing “first sale” rights as they 
apply to sound recordings). 
 110. See Jazz Photo Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 264 F.3d 1094, 1105  
(Fed. Cir. 2001). 
 111. See, e.g., Jazz Photo Corp., 264 F.3d at 1105 (“The unrestricted sale of 
a patented article, by or with the authority of the patentee, ‘exhausts’ the 
patentee's right to control further sale and use of that article by enforcing the 
patent under which it was first sold.”) (emphasis added). 
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Ottawa, Ottawa sought to invoke patent exhaustion, but the 
seed bag tag at issue imposed express restrictions that were 
inconsistent with Ottawa’s claim of exhaustion.112  The court 
held that the bag tag provisions operated as conditions on the 
sale of seed that overrode the general principle of exhaustion.113  
Stated another way, only an unrestricted “first sale” triggers 
exhaustion.  This ruling is consistent with the prevailing law. 
A more difficult issue concerning the application of 
exhaustion principles to the plant breeding industry is how 
exhaustion should apply to self-replicating products.114  The 
question arose in Monsanto v. McFarling,115 (McFarling I) in 
which Monsanto sought to enforce patents on ROUNDUP 
READY® soybeans against a grower who had saved and 
replanted seed.116  The grower argued, in effect, that when he 
purchased Monsanto seeds, Monsanto’s patent rights were 
exhausted not only in the purchased seeds, but also in 
subsequent generations of seeds harvested from crops that 
were grown from the purchased seeds.117 
The grower had purchased the seeds subject to Monsanto’s 
technology agreement, which expressly forbade seed saving and 
replanting.118  Reviewing the argument on appeal, the Federal 
Circuit could have concluded that the express conditions in the 
technology agreement governed over any contrary principles of 
exhaustion.  Instead, the court took a more formalistic tack, 
pointing out that the patents included claims to the seed, not 
just the plant, and concluding that because there was never 
any authorized sale of the saved and replanted seed, 
exhaustion could not have been triggered as to the saved and 
replanted seed.119  In any event, the decision demonstrates that 
intellectual property exhaustion rules do not present a serious 
obstacle to standard post-sale restrictions in seed contracts. 
                                                          
 112. Pioneer v. Ottawa, 283 F. Supp. 2d at 1031-32. 
 113. Id. at 1033. 
 114. For an early article analyzing this issue, see Scott A. Chambers, 
Exhaustion Doctrine in Biotechnology, 35 IDEA 289 (1995). 
 115. McFarling I, 302 F.3d 1291 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 116. Id. at 1293-94. 
 117. Id. at 1298. 
 118. Id. at 1293. 
 119. Id. at 1299 (“The original sale of the seeds did not confer a license to 
construct new seeds, and since the new seeds were not sold by the patentee 
they entailed no principle of patent exhaustion.”); see also Monsanto Co. v. 
Swann, 308 F. Supp. 2d 937, 941-942 (E.D. Mo. 2003) (adopting the approach 
of McFarling I on the exhaustion issue without further analysis). 
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B.  ANTITRUST/COMPETITION LAW 
Post-sale contract restrictions in intellectual property 
licenses may raise competition concerns.  While intellectual 
property licensing is pro-competitive in many circumstances, 
competition authorities have historically expressed concerns 
that intellectual property owners may use licenses as leverage 
to obtain market advantages exceeding those that the 
intellectual property laws contemplate.120  In general, under 
the doctrine of patent misuse in the U.S., post-sale license 
restrictions will be rendered unenforceable where: (1) through 
the license restriction, the patentee has broadened the scope of 
the patent beyond its expected and ordinary scope; and, (2) the 
anti-competitive effects of the broadening outweigh the pro-
competitive benefits under application of the rule of reason.121  
Some types of licensing restrictions are deemed per se to 
broaden patent scope with net anti-competitive effect — for 
example, post-expiration royalty provisions.122  Other types of 
licensing restrictions are ordinarily upheld under this 
framework – for example, field-of-use restrictions.123 
U.S. courts have now begun to apply this framework to 
various post-sale restrictions in seed licenses, upholding the 
challenged restrictions in cases decided to date.124  In Pioneer v. 
Ottawa, involving Pioneer’s bag tag restriction against resale of 
patented seed, the court reasoned that a utility patent confers 
absolute rights to exclude others from using and selling, so a 
license restriction against resale of patented seed is an 
assertion of part of the package of exclusive rights, not an 
attempt to broaden the scope of those rights.125  Accordingly, 
the court upheld the bag tag restriction as a matter of law – the 
court saw no need even to reach second part of the framework 
(the rule of reason question). 
                                                          
 120. See HERBERT HOVENKAMP ET AL., IP AND ANTITRUST: AN ANALYSIS OF 
ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES APPLIED TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW § 3.2b 
(2002) (stating that misuse occurs when the patent owner broadens the patent 
with anticompetitive effect). 
 121. Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700 (Fed. Cir. 1992) 
(upholding a single-use restriction).  Post-sale restrictions might also be 
challenged affirmatively as violating the standards of the Sherman Act. 
 122. Virginia Panel Corp. v. MAC Panel Co., 133 F.3d 860, 869 (Fed. Cir. 
1997), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 815 (1998). 
 123. See, e.g., Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc. v. Ottawa Plant Food, Inc., 283 F. 
Supp. 2d 1018, 1045 (N.D. Iowa 2003). 
 124. See generally id. 
 125. See id. at 1045-46. 
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In McFarling I, McFarling challenged Monsanto’s seed-
saving prohibition in its technology agreement as an 
anticompetitive tying arrangement.  Specifically, McFarling 
argued that Monsanto tied the purchase of its patented seed to 
purchases of second generation seed.126 In the context of patent 
license transactions, tying is a strategy for extending the scope 
of the patent grant by conditioning the grant of a license on the 
licensee’s purchase of additional, unpatented materials.127 
Tying is only impermissible under certain conditions: for 
example, the proponent of the tying allegation must show that 
the licensor applied actual coercion (forcing the licensee to 
accept the tied product as a condition of licensing the tying 
product), and that the licensor possesses market power 
sufficient to carry out the alleged coercion.128 
In McFarling I, the Federal Circuit took the view that 
there was no likelihood of success on the tying allegation based 
on a preliminary record because even though the seed saving 
restriction had the effect of forcing the grower to buy a fresh set 
of seeds for each new planting, the restriction did not force the 
grower to buy that fresh set of seeds from Monsanto, as 
opposed to buying them from one of Monsanto’s competitors.129  
In McFarling II,130 the court arrived at the same outcome, 
albeit via a slightly different analysis.  Monsanto sought to 
characterize the seed-saving prohibition as a field-of-use 
limitation, a type of contract provision that routinely survives 
scrutiny under a rule of reason analysis.131  The court resisted 
that characterization, reasoning that the grower engages in the 
same use of the purchased seed whether or not the grower 
intends to save and replant the second generation of seed.132  
Accordingly, the Monsanto technology agreement did not 
impose a restriction on the use of the licensed product per se; 
instead, it imposed a restriction on the use of goods “made by” 
                                                          
 126. See McFarling I, 302 F.3d 1291, 1297 (Fed. Cir. 2002).  McFarling also 
apparently advanced an alternative argument that the restriction illegally tied 
the natural soybean product and the patented genetic trait. 
 127. See id. 
 128. See HOVENKAMP, JANIS, & LEMLEY, supra note 120, at 21 (giving a 
precise rendering of the necessary elements of proof and a detailed discussion 
of relevant authorities). 
 129. See McFarling I, 302 F.3d at 1298 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 130. See McFarling II, 363 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (on appeal from a 
summary judgment that followed preliminary injunction proceedings). 
 131. See id. at 1342. 
 132. See id. 
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the licensed product.133  The court considered this distinction 
immaterial because the patent claim to seed would encompass 
the second generation seed as it would the first.  However, the 
court left open the possibility that a different rule might be 
appropriate for different circumstances.134 
In sum, cases to date have demonstrated no trend towards 
heightened competition law scrutiny of post-sale restriction 
clauses in seed contracts in the United States.  Undoubtedly, 
such contracts will continue to be the subject of litigation in the 
U.S. and elsewhere. 
C.  CONTRACT ENFORCEMENT ISSUES 
As litigants become convinced that courts will carefully 
circumscribe patent law and competition law challenges to the 
enforceability of typical seed contract provisions, litigants will 
begin to explore other avenues of relief, including general 
contract law.  A full exploration of this issue is beyond the 
scope of this article, but guidelines are emerging in U.S. case 
law and legislation that address whether a standard label 
license will be treated as a binding contract.  Under the 
Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), the terms in a label license 
can become part of a binding contract between “merchants” (a 
term that would include seed firms and growers) if the licensee 
fails to object within a reasonable time.135  However, the UCC 
also provides that terms that “materially alter” the bargain 
between the parties does not become part of the contract.136 
In the context of seed contracts, courts have resolved the 
tension between these two rules by holding that where the 
potential licensee (e.g., the grower who receives the seed bag) 
has knowledge of the bag tag license and fails to object within a 
reasonable time, the license is enforceable.137  Importantly, 
courts have also concluded that there need not be a direct 
showing of actual notification.  The requisite knowledge on the 
part of the licensee can be inferred from announcements in 
general trade journals and the like.138 
                                                          
 133. See id. at 1342-1343. 
 134. See id. 
 135. See U.C.C. § 2-207(2)(c) (2004). 
 136. See id. § 2(b). 
 137. See Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc. v. Ottawa Plant Food, Inc., 283 F. 
Supp. 2d 1018, 1047-48 (N.D. Iowa 2003) (citing Monsanto v. Scruggs, 249 F. 
Supp. 2d 746 (N.D. Miss. 2001)). 
 138. See id at 1047. 
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The contract law relating to seed licenses is only in its 
infancy in the U.S.  Many state legislatures are enacting 
legislation specifically tailored to regulate contracts between 
seed firms and growers.  Litigation over foundational contract 
matters such as those discussed here, and over new state 
legislation, should be expected to increase substantially over 
the next several years. 
D.  PREEMPTION ISSUES 
Finally, post-sale contract restrictions may raise questions 
that I will characterize as questions of “preemption.”  Suppose 
that a provision in a patent license agreement conflicts with a 
statutory provision existing in a plant breeder’s rights statute.  
Should a court conclude that the provision in the plant 
breeder’s rights statute overrides (preempts) the patent license 
restriction?  More generally, should a court engraft limitations 
from one intellectual property regime onto another regime? 
I will only attempt to answer that question here in 
connection with two specific scenarios.  In the first, suppose 
that the contract restriction precludes seed saving and 
replanting of seed patented in the U.S., and the preemption 
argument is founded on the existence of the statutory seed 
saving provision in the U.S. Plant Variety Protection Act. 
In McFarling I and II, the Federal Circuit held that patent 
holders can enforce seed saving prohibitions in patent license 
agreements.139 The statutory limitation on PVP rights allowing 
seed saving is just that: a limitation on rights conferred under 
the PVP regime.  It cannot “impart the right to save seed of 
plants patented” under the utility patent statute, as the 
Federal Circuit put it.140  A limitation on intellectual property 
rights in one regime cannot confer a “right” that applies to limit 
rights acquired under other intellectual property regimes.141 
In a second scenario, suppose that a contract restriction 
precludes reverse engineering of trade secrets embodied in seed 
that is sold to a customer.  Here, one preemption issue is 
                                                          
 139. See generally McFarling I, 302 F.3d 1291 (Fed. Cir. 2002); McFarling 
II, 363 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 140. McFarling I, 302 F.3d at 1299. 
 141.  The same general principle should apply to the PVP breeder’s 
exemption.  That is, the PVPA does not impart a “right” to breeders to conduct 
commercial research on patented plant varieties; it only creates a limitation 
on PVP rights.  A claim that a patent license restriction on breeding research 
“violates” the PVPA should be rejected. 
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whether the PVP research exemption preempts such a contract 
provision.  In Pioneer v. DeKalb,142 the court appeared to reject 
such an argument, although the court cannot be considered to 
have decided the issue squarely because the seed at issue was 
not protected by a PVP certificate.143  The same reasoning that 
was used in McFarling should also apply to this preemption 
argument.  It is likely that this debate will be driven by 
litigation on shrinkwrap licenses under software copyrights.144 
In sum, cases decided to date have suggested that seed 
firms in the U.S. have considerable latitude to employ contract 
provisions to draft around limitations in intellectual property 
regimes.  Future cases may clarify the precise scope of that 
latitude. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Intellectual property protection that supplements patent 
and plant breeder’s protection will continue to be important in 
the seed industry.  Trade secret protection has historically been 
an important mechanism for protecting the identity and 
genetics of inbreds, but in the future, utility patent protection 
is likely to be considered more attractive in most cases.  
Trademark and unfair competition protection are likely to 
become more important as the industry continues its shift 
towards differentiated seed products.  Limitations on 
trademark protection for variety denominations are important 
to the extent that the rationales for those limitations spill over 
to other debates about overlapping intellectual property 
protection for plants.  Limitations on unfair competition actions 
in the U.S. arising from the Dastar decision call for further 
elucidation.  Finally, seed firms have succeeded in litigation so 
far in the U.S. over the enforceability of post-sale contract 
restrictions, though this case law has only begun to develop. 
 
                                                          
 142. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc. v. DeKalb Genetics Corp., 51 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1797 (S.D. Iowa 1999) (holding that Pioneer’s claim for relief survives a 
motion to dismiss). 
 143. See id. at 1800. 
 144. See Bowers v. Baystate Technologies, Inc., 320 F.3d 1317, 1324 (Fed. 
Cir. 2003) (holding that the U.S. Copyright Act did not preempt a shrinkwrap 
licensing agreement that prohibited reverse engineering). 
